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Doing Business on an Indian Reservation:
Can the Non-Indian Enforce His Contract
with the Tribe?
Richard M. Grimsrud*

With the advent of modern technology, which makes the Indian reservation far less remote, and with the growing shortage
of domestic energy sources, which makes the reservation's natural resources far more attractive, the growth of non-Indian commercial involvement on the reservation is all but inevitable. This
is so notwithstanding new federal legislation designed to further
the tribe's own, internal economic development.' One factor inhibiting this outside investment, however, is the residuum of tribal sovereignty in the form of the tribal-immunity doctrine.'
This doctrine has been interpreted to forbid any suit against the
tribe-the logical party with which the outside investor would
contract-in either federal or state courts. The logic of the tribal-immunity doctrine also forecloses a suit against the tribe in
tribal court. Accordingly, the non-Indian businessman is understandably wary of the possibility that, should the tribe breach
the contract, he would have no forum in which to enforce the
agreement.

It has uniformly been determined that the doctrine of tribal
immunity bars suits against Indian tribes in state courtss and
* B.A.; 1965, Ripon College; J.D., 1971, Harvard University.
1. See, e.g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. 33 1451-1543 (1976).
2. The tribal-immunity doctrine derives from the limited sovereignty of the Indian
tribes recognized by Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831). See Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977) for a detailed discusion of the doctrine. While its continuing vitality has been recently doubted, it is still a
& C. W ~ K I N formidable barrier to suit against a tribe. See D. GETCHES,D. ROSENPELT
ON FEDERALINDIAN
LAW 259-60 (1979).
SON, CASESAND MATERIALS
3. See, e.g., Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 427-28,443 P.2d
421, 423-24 (1968); Bennett v. Fink Constr. Co., 47 Misc. 2d 283, 285, 262 N.Y.S.2d 331,
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similarly prohibits actions against subordinate tribal economic
organizations: unless the tribe or Congress has consented to suit
and waived the immunity.' The doctrine has also been held to
bar suits against tribal officials for actions taken within the
scope of their official duties? Although the U.S. Supreme Court
in Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Game7 held that
"tribal immunity" does not protect a tribal officer from suit,
some courts have continued to hold, in spite of Puyallup, that
tribal immunity forbids suits against tribal officers as well as
tribes?
In Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway,@the Ninth Circuit held that
the tribal-immunity doctrine proscribes a suit against an Indian
tribe in federal court unless Congress has unequivocally waived
the immunity or the tribe has consented to the suit. In that case,
the Hopi traditionalist faction was suing to nullify the Black
Mesa lease into which the tribe had entered. The plaintiffs had
not even named the Hopi tribe as a defendant, but the court
333 (SUP.Ci. 1965).
4. White Mountain Apache Indian Tribe v. Shelley, 107 Ariz. 4, 6-7, 480 P.2d 654,
656-57 (1971).
5. Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 428, 443 P.2d 421, 424
(1968). There is a serious question whether a tribe alone, without congressional approval,
could waive its tribal immunity and consent to suit. United States v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940), has been interpreted to require congressional approval of a tribal waiver of its immunity, and this congressional action will
not be implied if not unequivocally expressed. Long v. Chemehvevi Indian Reservation,
171 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (1981).
The most recent court of appeals decision to consider the question, however, held
that an ordinance consenting to suit against the tribe in state court, which was passed by
a tribal council and approved by a delegate of the Secretary of Interior, was an effective
waiver of tribal immunity. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537,540 (10th Cir.
1980). The finality of this determination will be uncertain for some time, since the Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 6th of 1980. 101 S. Ct. 71. It should be noted
further that such a tribal ordinance need be approved by the Secretary only if the tribal
constitution explicitly reserves to him such power of approval or disapproval, see, eg.,
State v. District Court, 609 P.2d 290, 291 (Mont. 1980), but it is certainly far from clear
that the tribe alone could waive its immunity under these circumstances.
6. White Mountain Apache Indian Tribe v. Shelley, 107 Ariz. 4, 7-8, 480 P.2d 654,
657-58 (1971).
7. 433 U.S. 165,168 n.3,171-72 (1977). See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
US. 49, 59 (1978). Of course, this amenability to suit will most likely exist only in tribal
court and only for activities of tribal officers which are ultra vires of their official duties.
Cf. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (finding absolute privilege for government official
in libel action); and F. COHEN,
FEDERAL
INDIAN
LAW284 (1958).
8. See, e.g., Graves v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 117 Arii. 32,570 P.2d 803 (Ct.
App. 1977).
9. 520 F.2d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1975).
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held that the tribe, as the lessor, was an indispensable party.1°
The court reasoned that because of the doctrine of tribal immunity, "the plaintiff thus does not have any forum to which it can
resort."ll
The various tribes' nonamenability to suit has become increasingly problematical as they attempt to attract the investment of capital from outside the reservation. Monroe Price poses
the following question: If an entrepreneur seeks to do business
on an Indian reservation, what guarantee does he have that the
tribal organization will keep to its promises?"12 "None" appears
to be the answer, although Price proposes a more sensible solution than the absolute bar of tribal immunity:
Judicial power should be withheld from cases involving Indian
tribes or individual Indians only because intervention would
violate a federal statute or some clearly defined congressional
policy.
The courts should replace the doctrine of residual sovereignity with a new doctrine based on Congress' present policies, beginning with the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934. . . . Those policies require that the courts and the protections of the Federal Constitution be available to non-Indians who enter into commercial relations with Indian tribes?

While Price's approach may appeal to reason, it is not the law.
Just recently the U.S. Supreme Court forcefully reiterated the
doctrine of tribal immunity1' to bar a suit against a tribe in federal court for alleged violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act.l5
More recent federal court interpretations of the immunity doctrine have applied it even more extensively to frustrate the exercise of federal court jurisdiction over tribes."
10. Id. at 1325-27.
11. Id.

12. M. PRICE,LAWAND THE AMERICAN
INDIAN
635 (1973).
13. Id. at 636 (quoting from Schaab, Indian Industrial Development and the
Courts, 8 NAT.RESOURCES
J. 303, 309 (1968)).
14. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 US. at 58 (holding that only a cause in
habeas corpus lies under the Act in federal court).
15. 25 U.S.C. $3 1301-1341 (1976).
16. See e.g., Gold v. Confederated Tribes, 478 F. Supp. 190, 196 (D. Or. 1979), holding that a tribe's participation in the formulation of a distribution plan for an Indian
Claims Commission award did not waive its immunity to subject it to suit by members
challenging the plan; United States v. Karlen, 476-F. Supp. 306,310 (D.S.D. 1979), where
the district court declined to take jurisdiction over a counterclaim filed by a rancher for
trespasses of a tribe's cattle on his land against the United States which had sued the
rancher on behalf of the tribe for trespass by his cattle and breaches of his lease with the
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A departure from this trend of limiting federal court jurisdiction over tribes occurred in Sturdevant v. Wilber,17 in which
tribal members were contesting a proposed governmental action
by their own tribe. There the federal court decided to exercise
jurisdiction primarily because the tribe did not have a tribal
court to hear the ~ontroversy.~~
The absence of a tribal court
apparently would not have changed the result in the Ninth Circuit case of Lomayaktewa,lBand, since most tribes today have
their own tribal courts, the precise Sturdevant factual situation
is not ordinarily presented.
But the Sturdevant decision is a reasonable and flexible application of the tribal-immunity doctrine, and the rationale behind the decision might be extended to provide the basis for obtaining jurisdiction over an Indian tribe even where a tribal
court exists. The argument can be developed as follows: Just as
the district court in Sturdevant exercised jurisdiction based on
the nonavailability of a remedy (because there was no forum), so
should any other federal district court hear the complaint of a
commercial enterprise which has no remedy against the tribe in
either state or tribal court. This nonavailability of a remedy will
nearly always be the case. In addition to barring suit against the
tribe in state court, the tribal-immunity doctrine will likely prevent suit against the tribe in tribal court as well for two reasons:
(1)There is rarely an explicit and unequivocal waiver of tribe's
immunity in either its charter,'O constitution and bylaws, or ortribe. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1979) (Indian violator of tribal game ordinance could not be tried in federal court under a broader yet still
applicable statute even though there was no tribal court in existence at the time of the
offense). But see United States ex rel. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Tri-County Bank, 415
F. Supp. 858 (D.S.D. 1976).
17. 456 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
18. Id. at 431. This is the only convincing distinction between Sturdevant and
Martinez made by the court.
19. 520 F.2d at 1326-27.
20. 25 U.S.C. 5 477 (1976), authorizes the issuance of a federal charter of incorporation to petitioning tribes. Such charters usually include a clause under which the tribal
corporation consents to suit in any court of competent jurisdiction in the United States.
See e.g., Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 150 Colo. 504, 508, 374 P.2d 691, 693 (1962).
While section 477 envisages that the tribes will conduct their commercial business with
outsiders through these federal corporations, Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian
Community, 451 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (D. Alaska 1978), the tribes with charters almost
uniformly contract as tribes rather than in the names of these federal corporations. Tele-
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dinances; and (2) by analogy to the principle that a federal court
clearly cannot exercise jurisdiction over the United States without the latter's explicit waiver of its sovereign immunity:' the
tribal-immunity doctrine logically would also require a tribal
court to decline jurisdiction over a claim against the tribe without such an explicit waiver. Consequently, under present law,
there is no forum in which a tribe contracting in its own name
can be made to live up to its c o n t r a ~ t s . ~ ~
It must be recalled, however, that whatever the utilitarian
common sense of this contention, stare decisis offers little support for its logic," although some commentators have interpreted Santa Clara Pueblo u. Martinez, as permitting the federal court to assume jurisdiction in these circumstances."
Nevertheless, the latest circuit court opinion to consider this issue has clearly reafiirmed the tribal-immunity doctrine in a commercial setting," as did the Tenth Circuit recently in a civilrights context patently differing from Sturdevant only in that
phone interview with Robert Moeller, Attorney Adviser, Field Solicitor's Office, Dep't of
the Interior, in Phoenix, Ariz. (Feb. 6, 1980).
Despite the Martinez v. Southern Ute holding, it is clear that a waiver of immunity
in a federal charter extends only to the tribal corporation and not to the tribe. See, e.g.,
Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. at 1131; Duluth Lumber & Plywood Co. v. Delta Dev., Inc., 281 N.W.2d 377, 384 (Minn. 1979). Even if the
waiver could be construed to extend to the tribe, however, it is doubtful that the issuance of the form charter by the Department of the Interior would amount to the consent
of Congress arguably required for such waiver by United States v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586-87 (1941).
22. The landmark decision of Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959), which promoted the non-Indian's use of the tribal courts to collect Indian debts, concerned a contract action against an individual Indian and, thus, did not involve the doctrine of tribal
immunity.
Just before the Sturdeuant decision, the Supreme Court had vigorously reaffirmed the tribal-immunity doctrine in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978), and every circuit which had previously considered the issue had clearly adopted
the doctrine much earlier. See, e.g., Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Citizens Natl Bank,
361 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1966); Green v. Wilson, 331 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1964); Dicke v.
Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, Inc., 304 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1962); Haile v. Saunooke, 246
F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1957). Cf. United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 694 (1941) (denying tribal immunity from state laws).
24. See, e.g., Comment, Tribal Sovereignty and the Supreme Court's 1977-1978
Term, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 205,214-16; Note, Constitutional Law: Santa Clara Pueblo v.
L. REV.
Martinez: Tribal Membership and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 6 AM. INDIAN
205, 214-16 (1978); 14 LAND& WATER
L. REV.625, 633-34 (1979).
25. Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474, 476
(9th Cir. 1980).
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the plaintiff was a non-Indian.'6
IV. RECOVERY
IN QUANTUM
MERUIT
Another approach for the complaining non-Indian promisee,
with no greater basis in logic but a somewhat firmer foundation
in precedent, is a suit against the tribe in quantum meruit
(rather than upon the express contract). The basis for this theory is the Supreme Court case of Winton v. Amos," which involved the claim of an attorney for services rendered in securing
the tribal enrollment and the consequent participation in federal
monies for Choctaws who had removed to Oklahoma. Some of
the lawyer's contracts with the Indians were held to be void because they were made in violation of a predecessor statute to 25
U.S.C. 08 81-85 (1976).s8 Nevertheless, the Court permitted a recovery in quantum meruit:

.

The fact that . . the services were rendered under contracts with particular Indians, whether valid or invalid, is no
obstacle to a recovery. Services not gratuitous, and neither
mala in se nor mala prohibita, rendered under a contract that
is invalid or unenforceable, may furnish a basis for an implied
or constructive contract to pay their reasonable value.as

While Winton v. Amos is distinguishable from the situation in
which a non-Indian is seeking recovery for the value of services
which he has performed under a contract with a tribe:O its unjust enrichment rationale may well be the best theory upon
which a commercial enterprise that has already entered into a
contract with a tribe can rely?

For the businessman contemplating a contract with a tribe,
surely the best protection he can secure for himself is to insist
that the federally chartered tribal corporation (organized under
26. Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 670, 673 (10th Cir. 1980).
27. 255 U.S. 373 (1921).
28. Id. at 391. These statutes generally inhibit Indians' capacity to contract only
with regard to trust property. See F. COHEN,supra note 8, at 164.
29. 225 U.S. at 393. See also Green v. Menominee Tribe, 233 U.S. 558 (1914).
30. Winton u. Amos again concerned a suit against individual Indians.
31. For another quantum meruit recovery against Indians, see Rollins v. United
States, 23 Ct. C1. 106 (1888).
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25 U.S.C. 5 477) rather than the tribe (organized under 25
5 476) be the legal entity with which he contracts. This is

U.S.C.

because most tribal corporations have, in their charters, explicitly waived whatever immunity they might otherwise have
possessed, though, even if they had not, it is doubtful today
whether they could avail themselves of the tribal-immunity doctrine." Although most of the corporations chartered under the
Indian Reorganization Act were intended to be the vehicles
through which the reorganized tribes would contract with nonIndians, they have seldom been used?
The non-Indian is not always alone in his desire to contract
with the corporation. A tribe may itself wish to contract through
its corporation. It may understandably be apprehensive about
its chances for obtaining jurisdiction over a contractual dispute
with a non-Indian in tribal courtS4and about its likelihood for
success on the merits in state c0urt,8~because there is some authority for the proposition that an Indian tribe cannot sue in
federal court for a simple breach of contract any more than the
non-Indian party to the contract can.86Hence, the tribe, as well
as the non-Indian party to the contract, could well find itself
without a forum which will afford an effective remedy in the
event of a breach?'
Moreover, nonamenability to suit in any forum is probably
not something the tribes consciously wish to take advantage of;
32. See In re Colegrove, 9 B.R. 337 (Cal. Bankr. 1981).
33. See note 21 supra. I t should be noted here that the Navajo tribe, easily the
largest in the nation, did not opt to reorganize under the Act. This discussion is therefore generally inapplicable to it.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978); Oliphant v. Susupra note 8, a t 382 n.210.
quamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,209-12 (1978); F. COHEN,
supra note 8, at 164; In re Liquor Election in Beltrami
35. See generally F. COHEN,
County, 138 Minn. 42, 163 N.W. 988 (1917). For potential jurisdictional problems, see
also Northcross v. Joslyn Fruit Co., 439 F. Supp. 317 (D. Ariz. 1977); Maloof v. Raper
Sales, Inc., 113 Ariz. 485, 557 P.2d 522 (1976).
36. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Martinez, 519 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1975). The
Ninth Circuit also recently acceded to this view. Gila River Indian Community v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, 626 F.2d 708, 714 (9th Cir. 1980).
37. On the surface, however, courts have often been more generous in providing a
forum to a tribe than to its litigational counterpart, notwithstanding the logical inconsistencies which may result. Compare, e.g., Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State
Bd. of Equalization, 492 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Cal. 1979), which held that tribal immunity
barred the assertion of a compulsory counterclaim by a state agency against a tribe
which had commenced a declaratory judgment action against the agency in federal court,
with People v. Quechan Tribe, 595 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1979), which determined
that the doctrine of tribal immunity foreclosed a state's maintenance of a declaratory
judgment action against a tribe in federal court.
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there is little doubt that tribal immunity has a chilling effect on
any outside investment the tribes might wish to attract." Consequently, the whole problem of tribal immunity can be circumvented if the potential investor is aware of the little-recognized
difference between the tribe and the federally chartered tribal
commercial corporation and insists upon doing business only
with the latter.39

VI. JURISDICTION
OVER THE UNITED
STATES
AS GUARDIAN
OF
THE TRIBE
Of course, the distinction between the tribe and the tribal
corporation will be of little consolation to the investor who has
already contracted with the tribe and partially performed under
the contract. However, there is arguably yet one more remedy
for the non-Indian party to the contract with the tribe. This is
available when, as is often the case with monies designated for
tribal contracts with non-Indians,'O the funds to be paid over by
the tribe are in the form of loans or grants from the federal government, or are being held in trust and administered by the
United States, and the contract has been approved by the federal government. Under these circumstances, the non-Indian can
proceed against the United States, which has waived its sovereign immunity in a fairly extensive array of causes, on the basis
of its guardianship over the tribe and its estate.
This approach has the obvious advantage of providing the
federal court with another basis upon which to ground its jurisdiction. The United States has waived its immunity, in limited
cases, from suits brought against it not only before the Court of
Claims4l but also before the appropriate federal district courte4=
The jurisdictional grant to the Court of Claims is for contract
claims of any amount; the waiver for suits in the district courts
is for both contract claims of less than $ 1 0 , W 3 and torts.44The
tort claims, before suit may be filed upon them," must first be
38. See Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. at 1131.
39. See id. at 1133 n.8.
40. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 3 3161(a)(3) (1976), which specifically singles out Indian reservations as areas of likely eligibility for grants and loans under the Public Works and
Economic Development Act, 42 U.S.C. 53 3121-3246h (1976).
41. 28 U.S.C. 5 1491 (1976).
42. Id. 3 1346.
43. Id. 5 1346(a)(2).
44. Id. 1346(b).
45. Id. 5 2675(a).
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submitted to the appropriate governmental body with a written
demand for a sum ~ertain.'~
For smaller claims then, the best section under which to
proceed is probably 28 U.S.C. 8 1346(a)(2)," which authorizes
the federal district courts to assume jurisdiction over any
civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding
$10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or
any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort.18

This subsection presents several possible theories under which
the Indian ward's estate might be reached by the non-Indian
promisee obtaining jurisdiction over the guardian government.
First, if the federal funds have not been turned over to the
tribe but remain in the hands of the disbursing government officer, mandamus against the officer compelling him to distribute
the funds to the performing promisee might be sought under
whatever "regulation of an executive department" controls the
disbursement.'@ However, the writ will lie only when the govern46. Molinar v. United States, 515 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Caton v.
United States, 495 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1974) for the general validity of 28 C.F.R. $5 14.1
to 14.11 (1980), the interpretative regulations promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1976) which govern the administrative claims procedure.
47. Subsection (b) of 28 U.S.C.
1346 (1976) waives federal immunity in damage
actions
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
Since the United States would not breach any clear duty by approving a tribe's contract
with a non-Indian, it is hard to see how its tort liability could arise. See, e.g., Salt River
Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Arizona Sand & Rock Co., 353 F. Supp. 1098 (D.
Ariz. 1972).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)(1976).
49. For example, the disbursement of the funds for certain Economic Development
Administration grants is regulated by 13 C.F.R. 305.86 (1980). If all of the prerequisites
of that section are met by the performing non-Indian promisee and still the funds are
not disbursed to him upon his application for them, it is certainly arguable that a mandamus under 28 U.S.C. §$ 1346(a)(2), 1361 (1976) would lie in the United States district
court against the government officer holding the funds. For a case where a Congressional
appropriation was held to lay the basis for jurisdiction under the "Act of Congress"
clause of 28 U.S.C. 8 1346(a)(2) (1976), see Benedict v. United States, 270 F. 267 (Ct. C1.
1928). See also Overlook Nursing Home, Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 500,502 (Ct. C1.
1977).
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mental agent against whom it is sought owes a duty to the party
seeking the writ.60 Thus, some doubt exists whether a mandamus would be appropriate in this context since the government's
duty to disburse probably runs only to the tribe."
A second theory would be that, in the situation under discussion, there is an "implied contract" between the non-Indian
promisee and the government that the promisee will be paid for
any performance he actually renders under the contract approved by the government. The trouble with this theory is twofold. The first problem occurred in the case of In re Sanborn,"
where an attorney had attached federal funds appropriated for
the Sisseton and Wahpeton Tribes in an effort to secure payment for legal services already rendered under a contract approved by the government. There the Supreme Court said that
statutes requiring government approval of such contracts "by no
means create a legal obligation on the part of the United States
to see that the Indians perform their part of such c ~ n t r a c t s . " ~
Second, and more significantly, this "implied contract" theory
has been authoritatively interpreted to encompass only contracts
implied in fact and not those implied in law;" and there is no
doubt that a recovery in quantum meruit is grounded in the theory of quasi-contract or a contract implied in law.66
Consequently, the optimum clause in 28 U.S.C. 8 1346(a)(2)
upon which to base an action against the government for a
quantum meruit recovery in federal courtW is likely the clause
50. See, e.g., Short v. Murphy, 512 F.2d 374, 377 (6th Cir. 1975).
51. By analogy, Gardiner Mfg. Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1973),
held that a subcontractor derives no contract rights exercisable against the United States
under a contract between his prime contractor and the government.
But see Porter v. United States, 496 F.2d 583,586-87 (Ct. C1. 1974), holding that an
instrumentality of the United States acting within its authority binds the United States
as a principal to its contracts, and U.S. v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903), holding that
Indian tribes are such federal instrumentalities. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United
States, 319 U.S. 598, 603 (1943).
52. 148 U.S. 222 (1893).
53. Id. a t 227.
54. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 287, 293 (1928). However, for expansive interpretations of the "implied contract" clause, see Bodek v. Department of the Treasury, 532 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1976); Armstrong & Armstrong, Inc. v.
United States, 514 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1975).
55. See, e.g., Baltimore Mail S.S. Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir.),
THELAWOF CONTRACTS
$5 1459cert. denied, 296 U.S. 595 (1933); 12 S. WILLISTON,
1459A (3d ed. 1970).
56. For claims over $10,000, an action could be brought in the Court of Claims. 28
U.S.C. $ 1491 (1976).
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which authorizes actions for "liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." Under this clause, the promisee would proceed against the United States as guardian of its
Indian ward's estate and seek recovery from that estate for the
value of his performance under the contract with the Indian
ward. By proceeding against the United States, the non-Indian
would avoid the tribal-immunity problem, thus permitting the
federal court to assume jurisdiction. The recovery would ultimately be from the tribe," the other party to the partially performed contract.
This cause of action is well established in law. It has long
been recognized that the United States is the "guardian"58 of
the Indian tribes and the "trustee"6e of their property rights and
that the Indian tribes are "wards"6o of the federal government.
Similarly, it is the undisputed general rule that

.

Although a [guardian] . . is intrusted with the care and administration of his [ward's] estate, he cannot nullify an agreement made by such [ward] with an innocent third person, apparently with the consent of the [guardian], in regard to the
disposition of such estate.
A contract made by [a ward], under the power of a guardian and by his consent, is binding on the guardian but not
otherwise."'

The guardian will be made to live up to his ward's contract "especially where the contract is not merely executory, but executed in the whole or in part . . and the parties cannot be restored altogether to their original position~."~~
Moreover, since it

.

57. Recovery would actually come from the funds of the tribe which are, in effect,
being held for it by its guardian, the federal government. Cf. Manchester Band of Pomo
Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (government has a
duty to properly manage a tribe's funds held for it in trust by the government); Hoopa
Valley Tribe v. United States, 596 F.2d 435 (Ct. C1. 1979).
58. The essential guardianship of the United States over the Indian tribes was first
set forth by John Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
59. See, e.g., United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417, 422 (4th Cir.
1938); Rainbow v. Young, 161 F. 835, 836-37 (8th Cir. 1908).
60. See, e.g., United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d a t 422; Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. at 607.
61. 39 C.J.S. Guardian a d Ward Q 76(c), a t 150 (1976) (footnotes omitted). See
also Stakes v. Jones, 125 So. 197 (La. Ct. App. 1919); Heffner v. Crowley Motor Co., 12
La. App. 451, 125 So. 198 (1929); May v. Webb, Kirby, 286 Conn. 11 (1787); Camp v.
Dill, 27 Ma. 553 (1855).
supra note 55, Q 254, at 87 (quoting Molton v. Camroux, 2 Ex.
62. 2 S. WILLISTON,
487, 154 Eng. Rep. 548 (1848), aff'd,4 Ex. 17, 154 Eng. Rep. 1107 (1849)). See also 2 S.
supra note 55, Q 251, a t 80.
WILLISTON,
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is entirely possible that a guardian might be personally liable in
these circumstancespa a fortiori, the ward's estate could be held
responsible for the goods or services for which the ward contracted (and received) with the guardian's consent?
VII.

~URISDICTION
OVER THE UNITED
STATES
AS
THE TRIBE'SESTATE

TRUSTEE
OF

The trustee-beneficiary relationship of the United States
and the tribe offers an even more promising theory upon which a
district court may assume jurisdiction. The invasion of a trust
established for the care and support of its beneficiarybs has been
upheld where the goods or services provided, for which payment
is sought, were not voluntarily contracted for by either the trustees or the beneficiary? Thus, the funds of the tribe held in trust
for it by its "trustee" should be reachable here, where the goods
or services rendered were specifically contracted for and received
by the beneficiary tribe with the explicit approval of its trustee,
the U.S. Government.
It is the general rule that, when a third person contracts
with a trust beneficiary and, by providing goods or services to
the beneficiary under the contract, assists "in the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust . . . , [the third person] may
be permitted to recover from the trust estate the value of the
goods furnished or services rendered by a suit in equity against
the trustee as such."67 Typically the only contracts which fall
within this rule concern the rendition of "ne~essaries."~~
However, its logic should encompass any goods or services provided
which benefit the trust estate0@
or "preserve or benefit the interest of the beneficiary,'"O- which, in a word, promote the "pur63. See, e.g., Camp v. Dill, 27 Ala. 553 (1855).
64. While a recovery from the estate of a ward cannot be had for the unauthorized
contracts of his guardian, see, e.g., McKee v. Hunt, 142 Cal. 526, 77 P. 1103 (1904), the
ward's estate should be reachable for his own contracts to which the guardian merely
assented.
65. According to the Supreme Court in Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S.
476, 497 (1937), the federal trust is to "manage the property and affairs of Indians in
good faith for their betterment and welfare . . . ."
66. See, e.g., In re Estate of Johnson, 198 Cal. App. 2d 503,17 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1961);
Estate of Lackman v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 165 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d
186 (1958). See also State ex rel. Conway v. Glenn, 60 Ariz. 22, 131 P.2d 363 (1942).
67. 3 A. S c m , THE LAWOF TRUSTS5 269.3, at 2279 (3d ed. 1967).
68. 2 id. 5 157.2, at 1216.
69. RESTATEMENT
OF TRUSTS
5 269 (1959).
(SECOND)
70. Id. 5 157(c).
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poses of the trust.'"' Those purposes are, in the governmental
trust under consideration, to "manage the property and affairs
of Indians in good faith for their betterment or welfare?
Hence, a persuasive argument that can be made is that the
value of goods or services already provided under a contract
with a tribe (which goods or services clearly better the tribe or
promote its welfare) should be recoverable by the providing
party from the tribe's estate via a suit in equity against the
tribe's trustee, the United States of America. Inasmuch as this
result follows even where the trustee has no notice of the transaction," the same result should follow where the trustee has approved the contract."

VIII. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of tribal immunity, which now undeniably
forecloses a suit against a tribe in either federal7' or state court76
and, if consistently applied, would do the same in tribal court,17
is a barrier which probably inhibits the flow of much-needed private capital, goods, and services onto the reservation. Understandably, the outsider does not wish to invest money or deliver
goods or services in reliance upon a contract for which there will
be no forum for its enforcement.
For the non-Indian promisee who has already entered into
and partially performed a contract with a tribe, there are several
theories in which he might ground his action to recover in federal court. He might sue in quantum meruit, which approach is
not absolutely unsupported by precedent,18rather than upon the
express contract. Or, after he demonstrates the futility of a remedy in tribal court (which court should, under the doctrine of
tribal immunity, dismiss the suit7@),he might bring an equity
71. 3 A. SCOTT,supra note 67, § 269.3, at 2279.
72. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937).
73. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TRUSTS
5 163 (1959); 3 A. SCOTT,supra note 67, $8
269.3, 157.2.
74. The major theoretical obstacle to this approach is that, since an action resulting
in a judgment which would expend itself upon the U.S. Treasury is considered an action
against the United States, Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963), an action which
would result in a recovery against tribal funds held in trust by the United States might
analogously be considered an action against the tribe.
75. Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d at 1326.
76. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Shelley, 107 Ariz. at 6-8, 408 P.2d at 656-58.
77. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
78. Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. at 393.
79. It is doubtful that the tribal court could take jurisdiction over the non-Indian if
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action in federal court, appealing to the conscience of the court
because he cannot get a hearing on the merits anywhere else? If
the contract contemplated the disbursement of federal funds
and has some form of federal sanction, the non-Indian's complaint against the tribe should be combined with one against the
government (which has waived its sovereign immunity in 28
U.S.C. 85 1346 and 1491) as the guardians1 or trusteesa of the
tribe's estate.
The best solution, however, is to simply avoid the tribal-immunity problem. The non-Indian who has not yet entered into
the contract with the tribe can accomplish this by simply insisting that the formal party with which he contracts be not the
It was through this entribe, but rather the tribal ~orporation.~~
tity that the Indian Reorganization Act envisioned the tribe
would do business, and it is this entity that, in its corporate
charter, consented to suit in any court of otherwise competent
jurisdiction.

the tribe brought the suit. However, if the non-Indian commenced the action in tribal
court, he would of course, be submitting to its jurisdiction. If, then, the tribal court does
not dismiss on tribal immunity but hears the case on the merits and decides in favor of
the tribe on the basis of customary tribal law where an application of Anglo-American
jurisprudence would clearly find tribal liability, an entirely different and possibly even
more intriguing question involving tribal sovereignty is presented.
80. See Sturdevant v. Wilber, 456 F. Supp. at 431.
81. See notes 40 through 64 and accompanying text supra.
82. See notes 65 through 74 and accompanying text supra. But see In re Sanbom,
148 U.S.222 (1893), where an attempt to reach tribal funds for a tribal debt in a suit
against the United States was unsuccessful albeit on grounds not foreclosing the theory
of recovery proposed here.
83. See Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. at 113133. See also Manekagon Dev. Co. v. Bois Forte Reservation Hous. Auth., 517 F.2d 508
(8th Cir. 1975).

